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Abstract
Using a unique sample of foreign affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa, we study the rela-
tionship of the extensive and intensive margins of their intra-firm trade with knowledge
transfer to them from their parent companies. We find that the engagement of foreign
affiliates in intra-firm trade and their share of intra-firm trade are positively associated
with the probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents,
trademarks, and brand names, technology and know-how, access to foreign supplier net-
work, and access to global markets. Foreign affiliates which engage in intra-firm trade
and those with a higher share of this type of trade also receive more important overall
parental assistance. The positive associations between intra-firm trade and knowledge
transfer in the form of patents, trademarks and brand names are weaker in countries with
relatively strong legal rights than in countries with relatively weak legal rights. Our find-
ings point to the interplay between property rights and intangible assets theories of the
multinational firm by suggesting that the joint role of knowledge flows in production and
of multinational firm boundaries as facilitators of transfers of tangibles and intangibles is
crucial.
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1 Introduction
Intangible assets theories of the Multinational Corporation (MNC) have highlighted the fa-
cilitation of the transfer of intangibles, rather than of tangible goods, as the primary reason
for the existence of multinational firm boundaries.1 Recent empirical evidence on the scarcity
of affiliated parties which trade tangible goods with each other within borders (Atalay et al.,
2014) and across borders (Ramondo et al., 2016, Blanas and Seric, 2017) has been viewed as
a validation of these theories (Atalay et al., 2014). Although property rights theories of the
MNC have undoubtedly put more emphasis on tangible goods, intangible assets theories are
incomplete as they remain silent about the differences in the transfer of intangibles from MNC
headquarters to foreign affiliates with and without intra-firm trade. The latter is particularly
relevant if we consider two essential concepts. First, according to the knowledge-based view
of the firm, final output cannot be produced unless there is knowledge exchange among differ-
ent stages of production (Simon, 1991; Grant, 1996b). Hence, the facilitation of the transfer
of intangibles accompanying the transfer of tangible goods is an essential issue for foreign
affiliates with intra-firm trade. Second, based on the former concept, MNCs which trade at
arm’s length, rather than intra-firm, are likely to face the crucial issue of non-internalised
knowledge transactions. Hence, their parent companies may be less incentivised to invest in
relationship-specific assets, including those of intangible nature.
This paper is the first to look into the differences in knowledge transfer from parent com-
panies to foreign affiliates with intra-firm and arm’s length trade. In doing so, it provides
novel empirical evidence on the associations of the existence (extensive margin) and shares (in-
tensive margin) of foreign affiliates’ intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports with knowledge
transfer to them from their parents. The identification of these associations improves consid-
erably our understanding of the role of knowledge flows in production and of (multinational)
firm boundaries as facilitators of transfers of tangibles and intangibles.
The empirical analysis is conducted with the use of firm-level data from the UNIDO Africa
Investor Survey 2010. The dataset includes highly detailed information about 1466 foreign
affiliates which engage in international trade and are located in 19 countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa. It covers the year 2009 and all sectors of the economy. Foreign affiliates are registered
businesses whose parents are based in countries of various income and development levels
inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
Although the dataset lacks time variation which could potentially allow us to study the
1Among others, see Arrow (1969), Teece (1977), Ethier (1986), Aitken et al. (1996), Ethier and Markusen
(1996), Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998), and Atalay et al. (2014).
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causal relationship of knowledge transfer from the parent with the extensive and intensive
margins of intra-firm trade, it befits the empirical analysis for three main reasons. First,
we capture knowledge transfer from the parent to the foreign affiliate with measures of the
importance of parental assistance to it in five main areas. These areas are the use of patents,
trademarks and brand names, technology and know-how, quality upgrading of staff, access to
foreign supplier network, and access to global markets. The measures range between 0 and 5,
with higher values indicating more important parental assistance. Using this raw information,
we also compute the benchmark and alternative overall measures of parental assistance as the
mean and weighted average, respectively, of the measures of parental assistance in the five
aforementioned areas. For the alternative overall measure, we use the first component loadings
of the principal component analysis as weights. Second, information on the intensive margins
of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports is readily available. Based on this information, we
then create dummy variables capturing the extensive margins of the two intra-firm trade flows.
Therefore, we can identify the existence and the extent of the vertical relationship between
a foreign affiliate and its parent without relying on Input-Output tables or disaggregated
classifications of products produced in the two entities (e.g. Alfaro and Charlton, 2009).
Third, the richness of the dataset allows us to isolate the relationship between knowledge
transfer from the parent and intra-firm trade by controlling for numerous firm-level factors in
regressions.
As the measures of parental assistance by area have more than two discrete outcomes with
a natural ordering, we estimate ordered probit models where each of these measures is used as
the dependent variable. The main explanatory variable is the dummy for intra-firm imports
or intra-firm exports, capturing the extensive margin of intra-firm trade, or the share of each
of the two intra-firm trade flows, capturing the intensive margin of intra-firm trade. When the
benchmark or the alternative overall measure of parental assistance is used as the dependent
variable, the model becomes linear and is estimated by OLS. In all regressions, unobserved
heterogeneity across affiliate countries, affiliate industries and parent countries is accounted
for by the corresponding fixed effects.
From the empirical analysis, we find that the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-
firm trade and their share of intra-firm trade are positively associated with the probability of
these receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names,
technology and know-how, access to foreign supplier network, and access to global markets.
Foreign affiliates that engage in intra-firm trade and those with a higher share of this type
of trade also receive more important overall assistance from their parents. The intuition
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for these findings is that parent companies of MNCs with intra-firm trade have a greater
incentive to invest in relationship-specific assets than parent companies of MNCs with arm’s
length trade and subsequently, they are induced to transfer more critical knowledge to their
foreign affiliates. Hence, the joint role of knowledge flows in production and of multinational
firm boundaries as facilitators of transfers of both tangibles and intangibles is crucial, pointing
to the interplay between property rights and intangible assets theories of the MNC.
By contrast, we find that foreign affiliates with intra-firm imports are less likely to receive
crucial parental assistance in quality upgrading of their staff. Existing empirical evidence
shows that the probability of engagement in intra-firm imports is higher in more skill-intensive
firms (Corcos et al., 2013; Blanas and Seric, 2017) and in foreign affiliates with a higher
intangible to tangible capital ratio (Blanas and Seric, 2017). Therefore, a possible explanation
for this finding is that foreign affiliates with intra-firm imports already possess the human
capital required to further process the intermediate inputs sourced from their parents. Another
possible explanation is that labour skills are incorporated in the inputs imported from the
parent and are thus sourced in embodied form (Keller and Yeaple, 2013). This finding,
though, and its possible interpretations should be treated with caution as it does not hold
when the estimating sample is restricted to foreign affiliates in goods-producing industries.
However, even if intra-firm imports substitute for the transfer of this type of knowledge, the
complementarity of intra-firm trade with transfer of the other four types of knowledge suggests
that the distinction between embodied and disembodied knowledge transfer considered in
Keller and Yeaple (2013) is likely to explain only a part of multinational production.
In relation to the empirical evidence on the scarcity of foreign affiliates with intra-firm
trade (Ramondo et al., 2016, Blanas and Seric, 2017) and on the intangible to tangible capital
ratio being a strong determinant of intra-firm trade (Blanas and Seric, 2017), our findings
also suggest that, even if multinational firm boundaries are mostly determined by the facili-
tation of knowledge transfers (Atalay et al., 2014), the most important of these transfers are
concentrated among the relatively few foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade.
Finally, we find that the positive associations of intra-firm trade with knowledge transfer
from the parent in the form of patents, trademarks and brand names are weaker in countries
with relatively strong legal rights than in countries with relatively weak legal rights. This
finding suggests that the parent companies of MNCs with arm’s length trade have a greater
incentive to invest in relationship-specific assets and to transfer more critical knowledge to
their foreign affiliates that are located in the first than in the second type of countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical
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background rationalising the relationship of a foreign affiliate’s intra-firm trade with knowledge
transfer to it from its parent. Section 3 describes the data, the construction of variables and
descriptive statistics for knowledge transfer from the parent to foreign affiliates with and
without intra-firm trade. Section 4 describes the econometric model, Section 5 presents the
main empirical results, while Section 6 discusses numerous robustness checks. Section 7
concludes and provides some suggestions for further research.
2 Theoretical background
In this section, we describe the theoretical background of the relationship between foreign
affiliates’ intra-firm trade and knowledge transfer to them from their parents. To this purpose,
we first introduce main elements of the knowledge-based view of the firm and the concept of
costly knowledge transfer and absorption and then, we incorporate these into the property
rights model of firm organisational choices developed by Antra`s and Helpman (2004).
Knowledge-based view of the firm
Two fundamental elements of the knowledge-based view of the firm is that knowledge
is a critical production input (Grant, 1996b) and that agents specialise in specific areas of
knowledge due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). The combination of these two elements
implies that final output cannot be produced unless there is flow of knowledge and ideas among
different stages of production (Grant, 1996b; Hansen, 1999). Put differently, the production of
final output entails that one production stage acknowledges the relevance of the expertise of the
other production stages to its own problems and has sufficient knowledge and understanding
of the problems faced and dealt with by them (Simon, 1991).2 Lack of knowledge exchange
among different production stages for coordination purposes can adversely affect production
efficiency. For instance, failure to consider manufacturability of a product at an early stage
is likely to lead to its extensive re-design and subsequently, to a delay in the transformation
of an idea into a commercial product (Simon, 1991).
The need for coordination among different stages of production emphasises knowledge ac-
quisition and application, rather than knowledge creation. Same as Grant (1996b), although
we acknowledge the importance of knowledge creation and its connection with knowledge ac-
quisition and application, our focus in this paper is on the latter. That is, we are interested
in the capacity of the foreign affiliate to add its own knowledge to embodied or disembodied
2This concept is valid regardless of the production process being concentrated in a single entity in a single
location, or fragmented across multiple entities in a single or multiple locations.
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knowledge that it receives from the parent company or any other affiliated or unaffiliated
party. In the case of embodied knowledge, the foreign affiliate makes implicit usage of sourced
knowledge in embodied form as it produces final output by observing only the manufactured
outcome of sourced knowledge, not the knowledge per se.3 However, the transfer of disem-
bodied knowledge remains crucial even in this case as it is unlikely that all types of knowledge
required for production can be transferred in embodied form. Therefore, we consider the costs
of knowledge transfer and absorption as particularly relevant (Teece, 1977).
Costly knowledge transfer and absorption
The literature highlights three main reasons for the relatively costly transfer and absorp-
tion of knowledge outside firm boundaries, one pertinent to the property rights view of the
firm and two pertinent to the knowledge-based view of the firm. The first reason is that the
biggest part of knowledge is of tacit nature (Polanyi, 1958; Keller, 2004) and thus, contracts
cannot be fully written ex-ante. In contrast to explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge cannot be
communicated based on a common language4 because it is hard to articulate and can only
be observed and acquired through its application (Polanyi, 1958; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Winter, 1987; Von Hippel, 1988; Von Hippel, 1994; Grant, 1996b). Being also part of a larger
system of inter-dependent components (Teece, 1986; Winter, 1987; Hansen, 1999) implies
that its effective use requires knowledge of the larger system.5 In short, tacit knowledge is
characterised by low codifiability, high complexity, low teachability, and high system depen-
dence (Zander and Kogut, 1995). Because of these characteristics, its conversion into explicit
knowledge is impossible or very costly as it leads to substantial information loss (Grant, 1996a;
Grant, 1996b).
Second, due to asymmetric information, the buyer of a knowledge input cannot know in
advance its productivity, while the seller cannot commit to truthful claims about it (Ethier,
1986; Keller, 2004). This makes it difficult for two unaffiliated parties to reach an agreement
on its pricing and licencing cost (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece, 1981). Third, regardless
of unilateral or synergistic generation of knowledge, the latter can be used competitively by
unaffiliated parties (Arora and Merges, 2004). In other words, market transactions involve
3For this case, see Demsetz (1988), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Eaton
and Kortum (2002), Keller (2004), and McGrattan and Prescott (2010).
4The language of statistical control systems in Cre´mer et al. (2007) is an example of common language. In
general, according to Grant (1996b), statistics is a useful language for the transfer of explicit knowledge (e.g.
Ford company’s cash balances), but inappropriate for the transfer of tacit knowledge (e.g. information about
the capabilities of Ford’s managers).
5For instance, if software module functions are highly system-dependent, they can be used effectively only
by employees who have knowledge of the larger system (Hansen, 1999).
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the risk of knowledge diffusion and expropriation.6 In particular, explicit knowledge can be
imitated very easily because of its high codifiability and teachability and its low complexity
and system dependence (Zander and Kogut, 1995). Tacit knowledge is also unprotected in
market transactions as it can hardly be patented (Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky, 2004).
Part of explicit and all tacit knowledge is stored in individuals but is created within firms
and is thus deemed as firm-specific (Grant, 1996b). The idiosyncratic nature of knowledge
implies that it is the most strategically-important resource that firms possess (Quinn, 1992).
It allows them to extend existing capabilities and create new ones that are not easily replicable
and subsequently, to maintain and increase their competitive advantage in local and global
markets (Grant, 1991; Grant, 1996b; Moran, 2007). Grant (1996a) highlights the association
of a firm’s superior profitability with resource- and capability-based advantages. Wernerfelt
(1984) argues that a firm aims for an advantageous resource position so that it will be diffi-
cult for competitors to catch up. Similarly, Prahalad and Hamel (2006) argue that a firm’s
long-run competitiveness stems from its ability to create competencies faster and at a lower
cost than competitors that will lead to the production of innovative products. According to
Grant (1996b), the longevity of a firm’s competitive advantage depends on the inimitability
of its underlying capabilities, while Teece (1986) argues that firm boundaries help innovat-
ing firms to avoid being outperformed by imitators and losing significant economic returns
from innovation. Knowledge protection is also likely to explain why host-country policies
that condition foreign investment upon technology sharing of foreign MNCs with local firms
act as disincentives for knowledge transfers from parent companies to their foreign affiliates
(Blomstro¨m et al., 1994; Urata and Kawai, 2000).
According to the literature on intellectual property rights (henceforth IPRs), their role in
protecting knowledge and subsequently, in reducing knowledge transfer and absorption costs
is important. In particular, it argues that non-integrated firms are more incentivised to make
relationship-specific investments in environments where these are strong than in environments
where these are weak (Arora and Merges, 2004). Arora and Merges (2001) highlight the role
of patents in facilitating knowledge transfers outside firm boundaries. Gans et al. (2002) finds
that start-up companies which are protected by strong IPRs are more likely to collaborate
with other firms under a licence or a contract.7 Instead, firms which operate in environments
with weak IPRs are less likely to contract their knowledge and technology and rather opt for
6Numerous real-life cases of knowledge diffusion and expropriation from unaffiliated parties, as well as of
unaffiliated parties which started as collaborators and ended up as competitors for the same product have been
reported in the business press (e.g. Apple Vs Samsung in Economist (2012a) and Economist (2012b)) and in
academic studies (Ponzetto, 2014; Arora and Merges, 2001; Arora and Merges, 2004; Moran, 2007).
7In general, strong IPRs contribute to the independence and viability of small, dynamic and highly-
innovative firms which act as suppliers of inputs to relatively large firms (Arora and Merges, 2004).
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non-licencing alliances such as joint ventures (Oxley, 1997; Oxley, 1999; Anand and Khanna,
2000; Zhao, 2006). In line with these empirical evidence, Ponzetto (2014) builds a theoretical
model predicting that the optimal organisational choice of the firm under strong IPRs is
non-integration.
Organisation of MNCs and knowledge transfer from the parent to the foreign affiliate
Antra`s and Helpman (2004) combine the property rights theory of the MNC (Antra`s, 2003)
with firm heterogeneity a` la Melitz (2003) in order to study the self-selection of firms into
different sourcing modes. Their model predicts that the most productive firms source from an
affiliated party in a foreign country by engaging in FDI. Less productive firms, instead, can
only source from an unaffiliated party in a foreign country by engaging in foreign outsourcing.
Hence, the most productive firms trade intra-firm, while less productive firms trade at arm’s
length. This theoretical result is driven by the plausible assumption that the affiliate set-up
cost associated with FDI is greater than the unaffiliated supplier search cost associated with
foreign outsourcing. In order to draw conclusions about the differences in knowledge transfer
from parent companies to foreign affiliates with intra-firm and arm’s length trade, we embed
into this set-up the concepts of knowledge flows in production and of costly knowledge transfer
and absorption described above.
Upon observation of their productivity and selection of their sourcing mode, parent com-
panies of MNCs with intra-firm and arm’s length trade address the generated coordination
requirements by transferring knowledge to their foreign affiliates.8 As knowledge flows are an
indispensable part of production and are facilitated within firm boundaries, parent companies
of MNCs with intra-firm trade are more incentivised to make relationship-specific investments
than parent companies of MNCs with arm’s length trade. Therefore, parents of the first MNC
type are induced to transfer more critical knowledge to their foreign affiliates as compared to
parents of the second MNC type (Zander and Kogut, 1995; Grant, 1996b).
In addition, since IPRs facilitate knowledge transfers outside firm boundaries, parent
companies of MNCs with arm’s length trade are more incentivised to make relationship-
specific investments and to transfer more critical knowledge to their foreign affiliates when
the latter are located in countries with relatively strong IPRs than in countries with relatively
weak IPRs. Finally, in the case that a type of knowledge can be fully incorporated into a
material input, the concept of knowledge flows in production does not apply anymore. Hence,
8Antra`s and Helpman (2004), Grossman et al. (2006) and Corcos et al. (2013) use the term “headquarter
services”, while Grant (1996b) stresses that the primary task of management is to deal with the coordination
required for knowledge integration.
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intra-firm imports from the parent can substitute for transfer of a specific type of knowledge
to the foreign affiliate, in line with the distinction made in Keller and Yeaple (2013) between
knowledge transfer in embodied and disembodied form.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
In this section, we describe the firm-level dataset, the construction of main variables9 and
their descriptive statistics.
We retrieve the firm-level data from the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010. The purpose
of this survey was the collection of information about “for-profit” public and private businesses
and their assessment of the current business environment in 19 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries.10 Face-to-face interviews were conducted for data collection purposes, primarily with
the most senior decision maker of the firm. Stratified sampling by the economic sub-sector,
number of employees and ownership of each firm resulted in the creation of a representative
sample of registered domestic and foreign-owned firms. The sample covers all economic sec-
tors for the financial year 2009.11 All raw monetary variables are in national currencies. For
cross-country consistency, we express these variables into US dollars (US$) with the use of
currency exchange rate data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
The extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm trade
In total, there are 6497 firms in the dataset, of which 2403 are foreign-owned. Information
on intra-firm trade of foreign affiliates is readily available in the dataset. Hence, the identi-
fication of foreign affiliates which are vertically linked to their parent companies is possible
without the use of Input-Output tables or disaggregated classifications of products produced
by the two entities (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). Information on the share of production in-
puts, by value, imported from the parent company in total production inputs captures the
intensive margin of intra-firm imports. Similarly, information on the share of direct exports,
by value, to the parent and/or a sister affiliate in total direct exports captures the intensive
margin of intra-firm exports. We capture the extensive margins of intra-firm imports and
intra-firm exports with dummies indicating that the corresponding share is non-zero. As
there are 728 foreign affiliates that have not reported values for either of the two shares, we
drop these from the sample. In addition to these firms, we drop from the sample 209 foreign
9A short description of the variables is included in Table A1.
10These are: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
11For a detailed description of the design and implementation of the survey, see UNIDO (2011).
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affiliates that do not engage in international trade. Among the remaining 1466 foreign affil-
iates that engage in international trade, 1318 of these are importers, of which 31% imports
intra-firm, and 621 are exporters, of which 33.3% exports intra-firm (Table 1). The average
importing foreign affiliate imports 20% of its production inputs from its parent, while the
average exporting foreign affiliate directs 17% of its exports to its parent or a sister affiliate
(Table 2).12
<< Table 1 about here >>
<< Table 2 about here >>
Knowledge transfer from the parent to the foreign affiliate
We capture knowledge transfer from the parent to the foreign affiliate with measures of
the importance of assistance provided by the parent to the foreign affiliate in five areas. The
five areas examined are the use of patents, trademarks and brand names, technology and
know-how, quality upgrading of staff, access to foreign supplier network, and access to global
markets. The measures range between 0 and 5, with higher values indicating more important
parental assistance. In particular, the lowest value indicates that the foreign affiliate received
no assistance from the parent, while higher values indicate that the foreign affiliate received
parental assistance that was not important, slightly important, important, very important,
and crucial, respectively. We also construct the overall measure of parental assistance as the
mean level of assistance received from the parent in the 5 aforementioned areas. Alternatively,
we construct it as a weighted average, with weights obtained from the first component loadings
of the principal component analysis.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the benchmark and alternative overall mea-
sures of parental assistance and the measures of parental assistance by area to foreign affiliates
with and without intra-firm imports (Panel A) and to foreign affiliates with and without intra-
firm exports (Panel B). The last column in each panel displays the p-values of the t-tests for
the statistical difference in the mean values of parental assistance to the corresponding foreign
affiliate types. In Panel A, all p-values are less than 5% and hence, all pairs of mean values can
be compared. In Panel B, all p-values are less than 5% except for the p-value corresponding to
parental assistance in quality upgrading of staff. The comparisons reveal that foreign affiliates
12Using the same sample of foreign affiliates, Blanas and Seric (2017) make a comprehensive descriptive
statistics analysis of the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm and arm’s length trade for the whole
sample, by affiliate sector, affiliate industry, affiliate country, and by pairs of parent countries and affiliate
sectors.
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with intra-firm imports receive, on average, more important overall parental assistance than
foreign affiliates without intra-firm imports, as well as more important parental assistance in
the use of patents, trademarks and brand names, technology and know-how, access to foreign
supplier network, and access to global markets. They, instead, receive, on average, less im-
portant parental assistance in quality upgrading of their staff than foreign affiliates without
intra-firm imports. Similarly, foreign affiliates with intra-firm exports receive, on average,
more important overall parental assistance than foreign affiliates without intra-firm exports,
as well as more important parental assistance in all areas except for the quality upgrading of
staff.
We also conduct the analysis by affiliate country, affiliate sector, and combinations of
parent countries and affiliate sectors. Whenever the t-tests allow for comparisons of mean
values, we document that foreign affiliates with intra-firm imports and foreign affiliates with
intra-firm exports receive, on average, more important overall parental assistance than foreign
affiliates without intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports, respectively.13 For the analysis by
affiliate sector, we use the ISIC Rev. 1.1 in order to split the whole economy into five sectors,
namely, agriculture (1–5), mining (10–14), manufacturing (15–39), electricity, gas and water
(EGW) supply and construction (40 and 45), and services (50–99). Based on Hatzichronoglou
(1997) and UNCTAD and UNIDO (2011), we further decompose the manufacturing sector
into resource-based, low-tech, and high- and medium-tech manufacturing industries. Similarly,
based on Eurostat (2011), we further decompose the services sector into knowledge-intensive
and less knowledge-intensive services industries.14 For the analysis by parent country and
affiliate sector, we consider parents based in high-income countries, in low/middle-income
countries outside Sub-Saharan-Africa, and in Sub-Saharan African countries. The first group
comprises parent countries which are classified as high-income by the World Bank’s Historical
Country Classification for the year 2010. Based on the same classification, the second group
comprises parent countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa which are classified as upper-middle-
income, lower-middle-income or low-income.
<< Table 3 about here >>
In addition, we compare kernel and percentile distributions of foreign affiliates with and
without intra-firm imports and of foreign affiliates with and without intra-firm exports in terms
13The relevant descriptive statistics tables are available upon request.
14Resource-based manufacturing: 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27; Low-tech manufacturing: 17, 18, 19, 22, 28,
36; High- and medium-tech manufacturing: 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38; Knowledge-intensive services:
61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 85, 92; Less knowledge-intensive services: 50, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63,
75, 90, 91, 93, 95, 99.
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of the overall assistance that they receive from their parent. The relevant figures are relegated
to the Online Appendix (Figures A1 to A4). Kernel densities demonstrate a higher skewness
to the left for foreign affiliates with intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports as compared
to those without intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports, respectively. Specifically, the
concentration of foreign affiliates with either of the two intra-firm trade flows is lower in the
left tail and higher in the right tail of the corresponding distribution. Similarly, percentile
distributions reveal a more important overall parental assistance received by foreign affiliates
with intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports in all 7 percentiles except for the 99th, where
differences vanish.15
Additional firm-level variables
In order to capture the size of foreign affiliates, we use information on the total number
of their permanent full-time employees. We compute labour productivity as the ratio of total
sales to the total number of permanent full-time employees and skill intensity as the share of
permanent full-time managerial, technical and supervisory workers in total permanent full-
time employment. The intangible to tangible capital ratio is the sum of expenditures on
training and advertising divided by the total value of fixed assets. The age of foreign affiliates
is the number of years since their establishment. Transfer pricing within MNCs16 is captured
by the ratio of taxes paid by foreign affiliates to their total sales. The descriptive statistics for
these variables point to salient heterogeneity across foreign affiliates in all these dimensions
(Table 2).
Information on the foreign ownership share of foreign affiliates allows us to identify the
majority-owned, that is, those which are owned by at least 50% by a foreign investor. In ad-
dition, information on five modes of foreign investment allows us to identify foreign affiliates
which have been created as wholly-owned enterprises, as joint ventures, through purchases of
pre-existing assets from local private owners, through purchases of pre-existing assets from
foreign private owners, or through purchases of pre-existing state-owned assets. The first two
modes capture Greenfield FDI, while the other three modes capture mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). By exploiting information on the principal motive for foreign investment, we also
15We obtain very similar graphs when we plot kernel densities and percentile distributions of the alternative
overall measure of parental assistance to importing and exporting foreign affiliates and of the measures of
parental assistance to them by area. As regards kernel densities, the concentration of foreign affiliates with
intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports in the left tail of the distributions is lower. In percentile distributions,
the importance of parental assistance that they receive is greater in almost all percentiles, especially, the
intermediate ones. These figures are available upon request.
16Transfer pricing is the transfer of tangible and intangible assets of the MNC to its foreign affiliates for tax
evasion purposes. Among others, see Desai et al. (2006), Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Bauer and Langenmayr
(2013), Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013), and Davies et al. (2017).
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identify the main business purpose that foreign affiliates serve. Specifically, this can be the
access to new markets, low-cost production, access to inputs and natural resources, collabora-
tion with a specific partner in the host country, exporting back to the home country, benefits
from a trade agreement, and any other motive to be specified by the firms themselves. The
descriptive statistics for the dummy variables reveal that most of the foreign affiliates in the
sample are majority-owned, have been created as wholly-owned enterprises, and their main
business purpose is to access new markets (Table 1).
4 Econometric model
The variables capturing parental assistance in five areas have more than two discrete outcomes
with a natural ordering. Hence, we study their association with the extensive and intensive
margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports by estimating the following ordered probit
model for foreign affiliate z in country c and industry j, whose parent company is located in
country p:
Kzcjp =α+ β1 ∗Xzcjp + β2 ∗ controlszcjp + βc ∗Dc + βj ∗Dj + βp ∗Dp + zcjp (1)
The dependent variable, Kzcjp, is the measure of parental assistance in one of the five
areas examined. The main explanatory variable, Xzcjp, is the dummy for intra-firm imports
or intra-firm exports capturing the extensive margin of intra-firm trade, or the share of intra-
firm imports or intra-firm exports, capturing the intensive margin of intra-firm trade. Import
regressions are estimated on the sample of importing firms, while export regressions are esti-
mated on the sample of exporting firms. Marginal effects are produced for the highest outcome
of the dependent variable (= 5). Hence, a positive (negative) and statistically significant β1
suggests that the engagement in intra-firm trade or the share of intra-firm trade is positively
(negatively) associated with the probability of a foreign affiliate receiving crucial assistance
from the parent in a certain area.
In contrast to the measures of parental assistance in five areas, the benchmark and alterna-
tive overall measures are continuous variables. Hence, when one of these two measures is the
dependent variable, the model becomes linear and is estimated by OLS. In these regressions,
the overall measures are normalised so that their mean equals 0 and their standard deviation
equals 1. This allows for an easier interpretation of their coefficient estimates, as each value
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of the normalised measures indicates its difference from the mean of the original measures in
numbers of standard deviations (Marin and Verdier, 2014; Bloom et al., 2014).
Unobserved heterogeneity across affiliate countries, affiliate industries and parent countries
is accounted for by the sets of dummies Dc, Dj , and Dp, respectively. A set of control variables
capturing additional characteristics of foreign affiliates is included in controlszcjp. On the
one hand, larger and more productive foreign affiliates have the technical and managerial
capabilities which are necessary for the absorption of knowledge (Teece, 1977). Older foreign
affiliates also have a greater absorptive capacity as they can develop capabilities over time
(Teece, 1977). The absorptive capacity is also greater in skill-intensive foreign affiliates and in
those with greater investment in intangibles such as training, marketing and R&D (Oshima,
1973; Teece, 1977). On the other hand, foreign affiliates with these characteristics may already
possess an important part of knowledge required for their operations and therefore, they may
be in less need for acquiring knowledge from their parent. Firm age may also capture the
development by foreign affiliates of backward linkages in the host and nearby countries over
time17 and subsequently, the gradual decrease in their dependence on parent companies for
production inputs and associated knowledge. In addition to firm age, the ties between a
foreign affiliate and its parent may also be captured by the first entity’s majority foreign
ownership status. By definition, the parent company of a majority-owned foreign affiliate
(MOFA) has residual rights of control over relationship-specific assets and the control of its
management. Hence, it is likely to transfer more critical knowledge to the foreign affiliate
(Long, 2005; Desai et al., 2002).18
In order to account for all these factors, we first add to the model the size of the for-
eign affiliate, captured by its total permanent full-time employment, and labour productivity,
measured as the ratio of total sales to total permanent full-time employment. The two vari-
ables enter the model in logs. In addition, we incorporate skill intensity and the intangible to
tangible capital ratio. The first is computed as the share of permanent full-time managerial
workers in total permanent full-time workers, while the second is computed as the ratio of
expenditures on training and advertising to the total value of fixed assets. We also add a
dummy variable indicating that the foreign affiliate is majority-owned (MOFA) and the age
of the foreign affiliate, captured by the number of years since its establishment. Using em-
ployment, productivity, skill intensity, and the intangible to tangible capital ratio as controls
17For instance, McAleese and McDonald (1978) examine the Irish manufacturing over the period 1952–1974
and show that input purchases of MNC affiliates from local suppliers increased with the years of their presence
in the country. Also, Belderbos et al. (2000) find that Japanese MNCs increase the local content of their output
by 0.6 percentage points with each additional year of operating experience in other Asian countries.
18For more details about this argument, see Moran (2007).
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is important also because these variables have been documented as determinants of intra-firm
trade (Blanas and Seric, 2017).
The potency of interaction between the parent and the foreign affiliate and therefore, the
transfer of knowledge from the first entity to the second, is stronger when the foreign affiliate
is a wholly-owned enterprise, rather than a joint venture (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980; Lee
and Mansfield, 1996; Ramachandran, 1993; Desai et al., 2002). In addition, according to the
resource-based view of the firm, cross-border M&As allow the acquiring firm to complement
its intangible technological advantages with a local firm’s capabilities (e.g. marketing and
distribution) that are imperfectly mobile (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; Antra`s and Yeaple, 2013).19
If such a complementarity exists, then the parent company is expected to transfer critical
knowledge to its foreign affiliate that has been created through M&As. For these reasons, we
incorporate in the model dummies indicating the mode of creation of the foreign affiliate (e.g.
wholly-owned firm, join venture). Since the five modes examined are mutually exclusive, we
consider the dummy variable indicating the creation of the foreign affiliate as a wholly-owned
enterprise to be the reference variable and exclude it from the regressions. Then, the marginal
effects of the other dummies of this group are interpreted with respect to this variable.
Knowledge transfer from the parent company to its foreign affiliate may also be determined
by the type of FDI and the main business purpose that the latter entity serves. We control
for this factor with dummies indicating the principal motive for foreign investment such as
access to new markets, cost-effective production and access to inputs. Although the vertical
link between the foreign affiliate and its parent is captured primarily by the extensive and
intensive margins of intra-firm trade, the dummies indicating cost-effective production, input
access, exporting back to the home country, and benefits from a trade agreement can also
capture this vertical link. Since the motives examined are mutually exclusive, we consider
the dummy variable indicating any principal motive to be specified by the firm itself as the
reference variable and exclude it from the regressions. The final control in our model is the
ratio of taxes paid by the foreign affiliate to its total sales and accounts for transfer pricing.
5 Empirical results
We start this section with the empirical analysis of the relationship between parental assistance
to foreign affiliates by area and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports.
19For instance, by 1987, NEC had entered into over 100 strategic alliances aiming at the internalisation of
its partners’ technology, skills, and ideas, which would complement with its core competency in semiconductor
manufacturing (Prahalad and Hamel, 2006).
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Table 4 displays the results of the estimation of the benchmark model with the dummy for
intra-firm imports as the main explanatory variable. The marginal effect of the extensive
margin of intra-firm imports in column 1 is positive and statistically significant at 1%. This
suggests that the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm imports is associated with a
10% higher probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents,
trademarks, and brand names. The positive and statistically significant marginal effects of
the main explanatory variable in columns 2, 4 and 5 are interpreted similarly. That is, the
engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm imports is also associated with a 7%, 4% and 5%
higher probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in technology and know-how,
access to foreign supplier network, and access to global markets, respectively. By contrast,
the marginal effect of the extensive margin of intra-firm imports in column 3 is negative and
statistically significant. Hence, the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm imports is
associated with a 3% lower probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in quality
upgrading of their staff.
<< Table 4 about here >>
Table 5 displays the results of the estimation of the benchmark model with the share of
intra-firm imports as the main explanatory variable. The positive and significant marginal
effects of the intensive margin of intra-firm imports in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 suggest that the
higher share of foreign affiliates’ intra-firm imports is associated with a higher probability of
these receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks, and brand names,
technology and know-how, access to foreign supplier network and access to global markets.
The insignificant marginal effect of the main explanatory variable in column 3 suggests that
there is no statistically significant association between the intensive margin of foreign affiliates’
intra-firm imports and the probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in quality
upgrading of their staff.
<< Table 5 about here >>
Based on the marginal effects of the control variables in import regressions, we document
that foreign affiliates of larger size, proxied by their employment level, are more likely to receive
crucial parental assistance in global markets access, while those with a higher intangible to
tangible capital ratio are less likely to receive crucial parental assistance in this area. Foreign
affiliates of higher productivity are more likely to receive crucial parental assistance in the
use of patents, trademarks and brand names, in technology and know-how and in access to
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foreign supplier network. Foreign affiliates which were domestic firms before being acquired by
foreign investors and those created as joint ventures are more likely to receive crucial parental
assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names and in quality upgrading of
staff, respectively. Crucial parental assistance in the first area is more likely to be received
also by foreign affiliates whose main business purpose is to benefit from a trade agreement,
while crucial parental assistance in both areas is more likely to be received also by foreign
affiliates whose main business purpose is to access new markets, to lower production costs,
and to access inputs and resources. Lower production costs and access to inputs as the main
business purpose of foreign affiliates are also associated with a higher probability of these
receiving crucial parental assistance in access to global markets.
Having analysed the relationship of parental assistance by area with intra-firm imports, we
now shift the focus onto its relationship with the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm
exports. The results of the estimation of the benchmark model with the dummy for intra-firm
exports as the main explanatory variable are displayed in Table 6. The positive and significant
marginal effects of the extensive margin of intra-firm exports in columns 1, 2 and 5 suggest
that the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm exports is associated with a higher
probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks
and brand names, technology and know-how, and access to global markets. The marginal
effects of the main explanatory variable in columns 3 and 4 are statistically insignificant at
all conventional levels, suggesting that there is no statistically significant association of the
extensive margin of foreign affiliates’ intra-firm exports with the probability of these receiving
crucial parental assistance in quality upgrading of their staff and in access to foreign supplier
network.
<< Table 6 about here >>
The estimation results obtained when the main explanatory variable is the share of intra-
firm exports are shown in Table 7. As indicated by the positive and significant marginal
effects of the intensive margin of intra-firm exports in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5, the higher share
of foreign affiliates’ intra-firm exports is associated with a higher probability of these receiving
crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names, technology and
know-how, access to foreign supplier network, and access to global markets. The marginal
effect of the main explanatory variable in column 3 is negative but insignificant, suggesting
that there is no statistically significant association between the intensive margin of foreign
affiliates’ intra-firm exports and the probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance
in quality upgrading of their staff.
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<< Table 7 about here >>
Regarding the marginal effects of the control variables in export regressions, we document
that foreign affiliates with a higher productivity level and a higher intangible to tangible
capital ratio are more likely to receive crucial parental assistance in access to foreign supplier
network and in the use of patents, trademarks, and brand names, respectively. In addition,
foreign affiliates of higher skill intensity and majority-owned foreign affiliates are more likely
to receive crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names and
in technology and know-how. Foreign affiliates whose main business purpose is to benefit
from a trade agreement are more likely to receive crucial parental assistance in the use of
patents, trademarks, and brand names and in access to global markets. Crucial parental
assistance in the latter area is also more likely to be received by foreign affiliates which were
state-owned companies before being acquired by foreign investors and by those which were
previously operating in the host country under a different foreign ownership. By contrast,
foreign affiliates which were domestic firms before being acquired by foreign investors are less
likely to receive crucial parental assistance in technology and know-how and in access to global
markets. Also, those whose main business purpose is to join a specific partner in the host
country are less likely to receive crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks,
and brand names.20
The analysis of the relationship between the overall measures of parental assistance and
the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports is made in
Table 8. In particular, the table shows the results of OLS estimations of the benchmark model
where the dependent variable is the benchmark and the alternative overall measure of parental
assistance in odd-numbered and even-numbered columns, respectively. As shown in columns
1–6, the marginal effects of the dummies for intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports and the
share of intra-firm imports are positive and statistically significant. The marginal effect of
the share of intra-firm exports is positive and significant in column 7, but it is insignificant in
20We estimate the regressions in Tables 4 to 7 with marginal effects produced for the other four outcomes
of the dependent variable (Tables A4 to A8). In line with the main results, we find that the engagement of
foreign affiliates in intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports and the higher shares of their two intra-firm trade
flows are associated with a lower probability of these not receiving parental assistance in the use of patents,
trademarks, and brand names, in technology and know-how, in access to foreign supplier network and in access
to global markets. The two margins of intra-firm imports and exports are also negatively associated with the
probability of foreign affiliates receiving unimportant, slightly important and important parental assistance
in these four areas. By contrast, the two margins of intra-firm imports and exports are positively associated
with the probability of foreign affiliates receiving very important parental assistance in the aforementioned four
areas. Also in line with the main results, we find that the extensive margin of intra-firm imports is positively
associated with the probability of foreign affiliates not receiving parental assistance in quality upgrading of
staff, as well as with the probability of these receiving unimportant, slightly important and important parental
assistance in this area. It is, instead, negatively associated with the probability of foreign affiliates receiving
very important parental assistance in this specific area.
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column 8. The results suggest that the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports and their higher shares of the two intra-firm trade flows are associated
with a more important overall assistance from their parent companies.
<< Table 8 about here >>
The marginal effects of the controls suggest that foreign affiliates with a higher skill in-
tensity and those which were state-owned before being acquired by foreign investors receive
more important overall parental assistance. This is also true for foreign affiliates whose main
business purpose is to access new markets, to lower production costs, to access inputs and
resources, and to benefit from a trade agreement.21
As stressed in the theoretical background, strong intellectual property rights induce firms
to transfer knowledge outside their boundaries. For this reason, we estimate the ordered
probit and OLS regressions of the previous tables after including interaction terms between
the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm trade and a proxy for (intellectual) property
rights in affiliate countries. For the latter, we use the legal rights strength index developed by
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). This index ranges between 1 and 10,
with higher values indicating stronger legal rights in these countries. The results of ordered
probit and OLS estimations are displayed in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of Table 9, respectively.
Each of the four panels corresponds to regressions with one of the key explanatory variables
and its corresponding interaction term. The legal rights strength does not enter the model
individually as it is captured by affiliate-country fixed effects.
The negative and significant marginal effects of the interaction terms in the first column
of all four panels suggest that the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm trade and
their higher share of intra-firm trade are associated with a lower probability of these receiving
crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names when these
firms are based in countries with relatively strong legal rights than in countries with relatively
weak legal rights. In addition, the negative and significant marginal effect of the interaction
term in the second column of Panel B suggests that the higher share of intra-firm imports
of foreign affiliates is associated with a lower probability of these receiving crucial parental
assistance in technology and know-how when these firms are based in countries with relatively
strong legal rights than in countries with relatively weak legal rights.22
21In tables that are available upon request, we show that the main results remain largely unchanged when
we estimate ordered probit and OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by affiliate country and affiliate
industry, by affiliate country and parent country, as well as by affiliate country, affiliate industry and parent
country.
22As part of the same empirical exercise, we interact the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
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<< Table 9 about here >>
In conclusion, our empirical analysis reveals that the engagement of foreign affiliates in
intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports and the shares of their two intra-firm trade flows
are positively associated with the probability of these receiving crucial parental assistance in
the use of patents, trademarks, and brand names, technology and know-how, access to foreign
supplier network, and access to global markets. Foreign affiliates which engage in intra-firm
trade and those with a higher share of this type of trade also receive a more important overall
parental assistance. However, the positive associations of the extensive and intensive margins
of intra-firm imports and exports with parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks
and brand names are weaker in affiliate countries with relatively strong legal rights than in
affiliate countries with relatively weak legal rights.
As discussed in the theoretical background, the intuition for these findings is that parent
companies of MNCs with intra-firm trade have a greater incentive to invest in relationship-
specific assets than parent companies of MNCs with arm’s length trade and subsequently,
they are induced to transfer more critical knowledge to their foreign affiliates. Importantly,
though, parent companies of MNCs with arm’s length trade have a greater incentive to make
relationship-specific investments and to transfer more critical knowledge to their foreign af-
filiates that are located in countries with relatively strong legal rights than in countries with
relatively weak legal rights.
Finally, two possible explanations for our finding on the lower likelihood of foreign affiliates
with intra-firm imports receiving crucial parental assistance in quality upgrading of their staff
are as follows. The first explanation is based on existing empirical evidence showing that
the probability of engagement in intra-firm imports is higher in more skill-intensive firms
(Corcos et al., 2013; Blanas and Seric, 2017) and in foreign affiliates with a higher intangible
to tangible capital ratio (Blanas and Seric, 2017). This evidence suggests that foreign affiliates
with intra-firm trade may already possess the human capital required to further process the
intermediate inputs sourced from their parents. As stressed in the theoretical background,
another possible explanation is that labour skills are incorporated in the inputs imported from
and exports with the rule of law index for the 19 affiliate countries. We draw data on this index from the Mo
Ibrahim Foundation for the year 2010. The index ranges between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating a
stronger rule of law in these countries. In line with the benchmark results, we find that the positive association
of the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm imports with the probability of these receiving crucial
parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names, as well as the positive associations
of their engagement in intra-firm imports and their share of intra-firm imports with the probability of these
receiving crucial parental assistance in technology and know-how and in access to foreign supplier network are
weaker in affiliate countries with relatively strong rule of law than in affiliate countries with relatively weak
rule of law (Table A9).
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the parent and are thus sourced in embodied form (Keller and Yeaple, 2013).
6 Robustness checks
In this section, we test the robustness of our main results by performing numerous checks.
To save on space, we show only a selection of the relevant tables, while the rest of these are
available in the Online Appendix or upon request.
Since factors such as geographic distance between affiliate and parent countries may affect
the cost of knowledge transfer from parent companies to their foreign affiliates (Teece, 1977;
Grossman et al., 2006), we re-estimate the benchmark model after replacing affiliate-country
and parent-country dummies with dummies for affiliate-parent-country pairs. As shown in
Table 10, the main results remain largely unchanged in terms of sign, size and precision.
Alternatively, we re-estimate an augmented version of the benchmark model where we control
for geographic distance, common official language, and past colonial ties between affiliate and
parent countries (Table A10). We draw data on these country-level variables from CEPII.
The main results remain largely unchanged in this case as well. We also find that geographic
distance between affiliate and parent countries is negatively associated with the benchmark
overall measure of parental assistance, as well as with probability of foreign affiliates receiving
crucial parental assistance in the use patents, trademarks and brand names and in access
to global markets. In some of the export regressions, we also find negative associations of
common language and past colonial ties between affiliate and parent countries with parental
assistance to foreign affiliates.
<< Table 10 about here >>
In addition to the benchmark variables for knowledge transfer from the parent, we con-
struct dummy variables indicating the degree of importance of parental assistance in the five
areas examined. We then estimate probit and OLS models where the dummies for intra-firm
imports and intra-firm exports and the shares of the two intra-firm trade flows are regressed
on the dummies for parental assistance by area. The dummy indicating crucial parental assis-
tance (i.e., rank = 5) in each area is treated as the reference variable and is thus excluded from
the regressions. Hence, in line with our main results, the negative and significant marginal
effects and coefficient estimates of the dummies for the importance of parental assistance point
to weaker associations of the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm trade with parental
assistance that is less than crucial (Table A11).
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As part of the same exercise, we estimate the benchmark model with alternative dummy
variables for intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports and alternative variables for firm size,
skill intensity, and age, as well as for transfer pricing. In particular, we use as the main
explanatory variable dummies indicating that imports from the parent and exports to the
parent and/or sister affiliate account for at least 25% and 75% of the foreign affiliate’s total
production inputs and total direct exports, respectively. Table 11 reveals that the results
are very similar to the main ones in terms of sign, size and precision. We also replace total
permanent full-time employment with total sales and skill intensity with the average wage and
the wage gaps between non-production and production workers, managerial and production
workers, and between managerial and non-production workers. We compute the average wage
as the ratio of the total wage bill to total permanent full-time employment. The relative wages
for different types of workers are computed as the ratios of the monthly wage for one type of
worker to the monthly wage for another.
<< Table 11 about here >>
The age of the foreign affiliate is replaced by dummies indicating whether its age ranges
between 1 and 5 years, 6 and 10 years, 11 and 20 years, or is above 20 years. We use the last
dummy as the reference variable and drop it from the regressions. As an alternative proxy
for transfer pricing, we use the tax to assets ratio, computed as the ratio of the tax amount
paid by the foreign affiliate to the total value of its assets. In all regressions with alternative
controls, the main results remain largely unchanged (Tables A12 to A16). We also find a
positive association of sales with the probability of foreign affiliates receiving crucial parental
assistance in the use of patents, trademarks, and brand names, technology and know-how and
access to foreign supplier network. The wage gaps between non-production and production
workers and between managerial and non-production workers are positively associated with
the probability of foreign affiliates receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents,
trademarks, and brand names. By contrast, the wage gap between managerial and production
workers is negatively associated with overall parental assistance, as well as with the probability
of foreign affiliates receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks, and
brand names and in access to foreign supplier network. Also, the youngest foreign affiliates
and those between 10 and 20 years old receive more important and less important parental
assistance, respectively, than foreign affiliates with 20+ years of age. We find no statistically
significant associations of the average wage and the tax to assets ratio with all measures of
parental assistance.
In an additional exercise, we ensure that the relationship of knowledge transfer from the
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parent with intra-firm trade is not influenced by the source of competition that foreign affiliates
face. In doing so, we incorporate in the benchmark model dummy variables indicating that
competition for the foreign affiliate’s main product comes mostly from imports, from domestic
firms in the host country, or from other foreign-owned firms in the host country. The first
dummy is considered as the reference variable and is excluded from the regressions. Table 12
shows that the main results remain largely unchanged. In both import and export regressions,
we find that parental assistance to foreign affiliates facing competition mostly from domestic
firms in the host country is less important than parental assistance to foreign affiliates facing
mostly import competition. In export regressions, we also find that parental assistance to
foreign affiliates facing competition mostly from other foreign-owned firms in the host country
is more important than parental assistance to foreign affiliates facing competition mostly from
imports.
<< Table 12 about here >>
As the acquisition of machinery and technological equipment from the parent is likely to
be associated with both intra-firm trade and knowledge transfer from the parent, we control
in additional regressions for the main channel through which the firm acquires capital goods.
In particular, we add to the benchmark model dummy variables indicating whether capital
goods are imported directly by the foreign affiliate, are acquired from local distributors, or
are acquired from the parent company. We consider the dummy indicating acquisition of
capital goods from any other source to be specified by the firm as the reference variable. The
question regarding the main mode of acquisition of capital goods is addressed only to foreign
affiliates in non-services industries and hence, these regressions are estimated on a sample
covering only the non-services economy. By and large, the main results remain unchanged,
as shown in Table 13. In import regressions, we also find a positive association between
acquisition of capital goods from the parent and the probability of foreign affiliates receiving
crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks, and brand names. In export
regressions, we find negative associations of acquisition of capital goods through direct imports
and local distributors with overall parental assistance and the probability of foreign affiliates
receiving crucial parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks, and brand names.
<< Table 13 about here >>
Following Atalay et al. (2014), in Table 14 we obtain very similar results to the main ones
in estimations of the benchmark model on a sample which comprises only firms in goods-
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producing industries.23 The only crucial difference is that the negative association between
the engagement in intra-firm imports and the probability of foreign affiliates receiving cru-
cial parental assistance in quality upgrading of their staff becomes statistically insignificant.
Hence, the relevant finding in the main results table and its possible interpretations should
be treated with caution. Finally, using information on the importance of assistance received
by individual foreign investors from other associate companies of the business group in the
five areas examined, we obtain very similar results to those from benchmark ordered probit
estimations (Table A17).
<< Table 14 about here >>
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we use a unique sample of foreign affiliates in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries
in order to study the relationship of the extensive and intensive margins of their intra-firm
trade with knowledge transfer to them from their parent companies.
We find that the engagement of foreign affiliates in intra-firm trade and their share of intra-
firm trade are positively associated with the probability of these receiving crucial parental
assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names, technology and know-how,
access to foreign supplier network, and access to global markets. Foreign affiliates which
engage in intra-firm trade and those with a higher share of intra-firm trade also receive more
important overall assistance from their parents. Importantly, the positive associations of
intra-firm trade with parental assistance in the use of patents, trademarks and brand names
are weaker in countries with relatively strong legal rights than in countries with relatively
weak legal rights.
These findings point to the interplay between property rights and intangible assets theories
of the MNC. In particular, they suggest that the joint role of knowledge flows in production
and of multinational firm boundaries as facilitators of both tangibles and intangibles is crucial.
The identification of the causal relationship between knowledge transfer from the parent and
intra-firm trade could shed more light on the interplay between these two types of theories
as it could indicate whether the facilitation of transfers of tangibles goods or intangibles
is the primary reason for the creation of foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade. Since the
23In accord with the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq id=182 –
accessed June 13, 2017) and the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag06.htm#
about – accessed June 13, 2017), this sample comprises foreign affiliates in agriculture (1–5), mining (10–14),
manufacturing (15–39), and construction (45).
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current form of our dataset lacks the time dimension which could potentially allow us to study
the causal relationship between knowledge transfer from the parent and intra-firm trade, we
consider this topic as a promising avenue for future research.
With respect to the empirical evidence on the scarcity of foreign affiliates with intra-
firm trade (Ramondo et al., 2016; Blanas and Seric, 2017) and on the intangible to tangible
capital ratio being a strong determinant of intra-firm trade (Blanas and Seric, 2017), our
findings also suggest that, even if the primary role of multinational firm boundaries is the
facilitation of knowledge transfers (Atalay et al., 2014), the most important of these transfers
are concentrated among the relatively few foreign affiliates with intra-firm trade. This is likely
to have important implications for the role of FDI as a channel for cross-country knowledge
diffusion (Keller, 2004), calling for further theoretical and empirical investigation on the new
basis highlighted above.
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Tables with main descriptive statistics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dummy variables
Dummy variable No Yes Total
# % # % # %
intra-firm imports 909 69 409 31 1318 100
intra-firm exports 414 66.7 207 33.3 621 100
majority-owned foreign affiliate (MOFA) 170 11.8 1272 88.2 1442 100
wholly-owned firm 455 31.5 988 68.5 1443 100
joint venture 1207 83.6 236 16.4 1443 100
local firm acquisition 1357 94 86 6 1443 100
foreign firm acquisition 1353 93.8 90 6.2 1443 100
privatisation 1400 97 43 3 1443 100
principal motive to invest: market access 412 28.7 1022 71.3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: low-cost structure 1331 92.8 103 7.2 1434 100
principal motive to invest: input access 1329 92.7 105 7.3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: join partner 1381 96.3 53 3.7 1434 100
principal motive to invest: export back home 1401 97.7 33 2.3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: TA benefits 1391 97 43 3 1434 100
principal motive to invest: other 1359 94.8 75 5.2 1434 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Each dummy is equal to 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise.
The descriptive statistics for the dummies indicating engagement in intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports
are produced on the samples of importing and exporting foreign affiliates, respectively, and conditional on the
response rates for the corresponding intra-firm trade flows. The descriptive statistics for the rest of the variables
are produced on the sample of trading foreign affiliates. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for non-dummy variables
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max
intra-firm imports (share) 1318 0.20 0.36 0 1
intra-firm exports (share) 621 0.17 0.33 0 1
employment 1455 220 655 0 15887
productivity 1424 21 337 0 11409
skill intensity 1425 0.18 0.15 0 1
intangible to tangible capital 1400 1.63 31.28 0 838
firm age 1458 19 17 1 142
tax to sales 1287 0.05 0.09 0 1
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The descriptive statistics for the shares of intra-firm im-
ports and intra-firm exports are produced on the samples of importing and exporting
foreign affiliates, respectively, and conditional on the response rates for the corresponding
intra-firm trade flows. The descriptive statistics for the rest of the variables are produced
on the sample of trading foreign affiliates. For the description of the variables, see Ta-
ble A1.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for parental assistance to importing and exporting foreign
affiliates
Panel A: Importing foreign affiliates
Type of parental assistance Intra-firm imports Obs Mean Sd Min Max t-test (pvalue)
overall (mean)
without 890 3.3 1.1 0 5
0.000
with 397 3.5 0.9 0 5
overall (weighted average)
without 890 3.2 1.1 0 5
0.000
with 397 3.5 0.9 0 5
patents, trademarks, brand names
without 886 3 1.6 0 5
0.000
with 394 3.6 1.4 0 5
technology and know-how
without 886 3.4 1.3 0 5
0.000
with 396 3.7 1.2 0 5
quality upgrading of staff
without 887 3.2 1.2 0 5
0.015
with 395 3 1.3 0 5
foreign supplier network access
without 888 3.5 1.3 0 5
0.006
with 395 3.7 1.2 0 5
global markets access
without 883 3.1 1.6 0 5
0.000
with 394 3.5 1.5 0 5
Panel B: Exporting foreign affiliates
Type of parental assistance Intra-firm exports Obs Mean Sd Min Max t-test (pvalue)
overall (mean)
without 402 3.3 1.1 0 5
0.000
with 204 3.6 0.9 0 5
overall (weighted average)
without 402 3.3 1.1 0 5
0.000
with 204 3.6 1 0 5
patents, trademarks, brand names
without 402 3.1 1.6 0 5
0.000
with 202 3.7 1.3 0 5
technology and know-how
without 402 3.4 1.4 0 5
0.001
with 202 3.7 1.1 0 5
quality upgrading of staff
without 402 3.1 1.3 0 5
0.679
with 202 3.1 1.3 0 5
foreign supplier network access
without 402 3.5 1.4 0 5
0.032
with 202 3.7 1.2 0 5
global markets access
without 402 3.4 1.5 0 5
0.000
with 203 3.9 1.3 0 5
Notes: Authors’ calculations. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Tables with main results
Table 4: Parental assistance by area and the extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.03** 0.04* 0.05**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
employment 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.01 0.02**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.009]
productivity 0.01** 0.01* -0.005 0.01** -0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
skill intensity 0.07 0.06 -0.004 -0.03 -0.04
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0003 0.0002 0.00004 0.000004 -0.0003*
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002]
MOFA 0.04 0.06* 0.008 -0.02 -0.007
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
firm age -0.0005 -0.00005 -0.00004 0.0004 -0.0004
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0007]
joint venture -0.02 0.006 0.03* 0.03 0.03
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
local firm acquisition 0.08* 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.008
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
foreign firm acquisition 0.001 0.005 -0.01 0.001 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
privatisation 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.03
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
market access 0.09* 0.02 0.08** 0.07 0.07
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05]
low cost 0.1** 0.03 0.08** 0.1 0.1**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
input access 0.2*** 0.06 0.1*** 0.05 0.1*
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
join partner -0.008 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.02
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
export back home 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01
[0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09]
TA benefits 0.2*** -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.1
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
tax to sales -0.08 -0.06 -0.009 -0.1 -0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.4 -1421.6 -1519.1 -1496.0 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment
and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in
all columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description
of the variables, see Table A1. 27
Table 5: Parental assistance by area and the intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.03 0.07** 0.07**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
employment 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.01 0.02**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.009]
productivity 0.01** 0.01* -0.006 0.01** -0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
skill intensity 0.06 0.06 -0.005 -0.04 -0.05
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0003 0.0002 0.00002 0.00002 -0.0003*
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002]
MOFA 0.05 0.06** 0.007 -0.02 -0.006
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
firm age -0.0003 0.0001 -0.00009 0.0005 -0.0003
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0007]
joint venture -0.02 0.003 0.03* 0.02 0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
local firm acquisition 0.08* 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.007
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
foreign firm acquisition -0.004 0.002 -0.010 -0.0003 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
privatisation 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.03
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
market access 0.09* 0.02 0.08** 0.06 0.07
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05]
low cost 0.1** 0.03 0.08* 0.1 0.1**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
input access 0.2*** 0.06 0.1*** 0.05 0.1*
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
join partner -0.004 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.02
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
export back home 0.1 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.010
[0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09]
TA benefits 0.2*** -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.1
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
tax to sales -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.1 -0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.1 -1419.1 -1520.2 -1494.8 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment
and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in
all columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description
of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 6: Parental assistance by area and the extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.08*** 0.06** -0.006 0.04 0.10***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04]
employment -0.01 0.007 0.002 0.01 0.006
[0.01] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.02]
productivity -0.002 0.01 -0.001 0.02* 0.006
[0.008] [0.009] [0.005] [0.009] [0.01]
skill intensity 0.3*** 0.3** 0.05 0.06 -0.05
[0.08] [0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0003** 0.00009 -0.00006 -0.0001 -0.0005
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.00009] [0.0001] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.09** 0.09** 0.01 0.004 0.05
[0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05]
firm age 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0004
[0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0005] [0.0009] [0.0010]
joint venture 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04]
local firm acquisition 0.008 -0.09* -0.02 -0.04 -0.10*
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05]
foreign firm acquisition 0.002 0.04 -0.009 -0.05 0.1**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.07]
privatisation 0.1 0.09 0.05 0.2* 0.2*
[0.08] [0.10] [0.05] [0.09] [0.10]
market access 0.04 -0.004 0.04 0.003 0.07
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
low cost 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.09
[0.08] [0.07] [0.04] [0.08] [0.09]
input access 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.1
[0.07] [0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.08]
join partner -0.2*** -0.09 0.05 -0.08 -0.001
[0.08] [0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1]
export back home 0.1 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.04
[0.1] [0.2] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1]
TA benefits 0.2* -0.08 -0.08 0.1 0.2*
[0.08] [0.1] [0.05] [0.10] [0.10]
tax to sales 0.05 0.1 0.0001 0.1 0.2
[0.1] [0.2] [0.07] [0.1] [0.2]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.0 -642.2 -685.3 -647.1 -676.7
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment
and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in
all columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description
of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 7: Parental assistance by area and the intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.1** -0.04 0.10** 0.1**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06]
employment -0.01 0.009 0.002 0.01 0.009
[0.01] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.02]
productivity -0.0008 0.02* -0.001 0.02* 0.008
[0.008] [0.009] [0.005] [0.009] [0.01]
skill intensity 0.2*** 0.3** 0.05 0.05 -0.06
[0.09] [0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0003** 0.00008 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0005
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.00009] [0.0001] [0.0003]
MOFA 0.08** 0.08* 0.01 0.001 0.04
[0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05]
firm age 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0003
[0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0005] [0.0009] [0.0010]
joint venture 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04]
local firm acquisition 0.007 -0.09* -0.02 -0.04 -0.09*
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05]
foreign firm acquisition 0.003 0.04 -0.009 -0.05 0.1**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.07]
privatisation 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.1 0.2*
[0.08] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.10]
market access 0.04 -0.003 0.04 -0.00007 0.07
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07]
low cost 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.10
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.08] [0.09]
input access 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.1
[0.07] [0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.08]
join partner -0.2*** -0.09 0.05 -0.08 -0.006
[0.08] [0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1]
export back home 0.1 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.02
[0.1] [0.2] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1]
TA benefits 0.2** -0.07 -0.08 0.1 0.2*
[0.08] [0.1] [0.05] [0.10] [0.10]
tax to sales 0.07 0.1 -0.0001 0.1 0.2
[0.1] [0.2] [0.07] [0.1] [0.2]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.5 -642.1 -684.3 -645.6 -678.6
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment
and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in
all columns. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description
of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 8: Overall parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm
imports and intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: overall overall overall overall overall overall overall overall
measure measure measure measure measure measure measure measure
(mean) (weighted average) (mean) (weighted average) (mean) (weighted average) (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.2** 0.2***
[0.07] [0.07]
intra-firm imports (share) 0.2*** 0.3***
[0.09] [0.09]
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.2** 0.2**
[0.10] [0.10]
intra-firm exports (share) 0.3** 0.2
[0.1] [0.2]
employment 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.005 -0.005 0.0003 0.0004
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
productivity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.007 0.01 0.01 0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
skill intensity 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.6* 0.6* 0.6* 0.6*
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3]
intangible to tangible capital 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007]
MOFA 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
firm age -0.00004 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
joint venture 0.1 0.1 0.10 0.10 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
local firm acquisition 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
foreign firm acquisition 0.01 -0.03 0.005 -0.04 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
privatisation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4* 0.4 0.4*
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2]
market access 0.4** 0.3** 0.4** 0.3** 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
low cost 0.5** 0.5** 0.4** 0.4** 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3]
input access 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.6*** 0.5*** 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3]
join partner 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3]
export back home 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.05
[0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4]
TA benefits 0.4* 0.2 0.4* 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3]
tax to sales -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
[0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.6] [0.6] [0.6] [0.6]
Obs 1061 1061 1061 1061 505 505 505 505
R2 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among
non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the
variables, see Table A1.
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Table 9: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (the role of legal rights strength in affiliate countries)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.2*** 0.2*** -0.07* 0.08 -0.006 0.3 0.4**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
* affiliate-country legal rights -0.02** -0.01 0.006 -0.007 0.010 -0.02 -0.03
[0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.091 0.087 0.080 0.059 0.077
Log − likelihood -1572.4 -1420.4 -1518.3 -1495.7 -1623.7
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.3*** 0.3*** -0.08* 0.1* -0.01 0.4* 0.5**
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.08] [0.07] [0.2] [0.2]
* affiliate-country legal rights -0.03** -0.03** 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.06
[0.02] [0.02] [0.010] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.091 0.090 0.079 0.060 0.077
Log − likelihood -1572.4 -1416.4 -1519.4 -1494.2 -1623.5
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.3*** 0.1 0.02 0.08 0.1 0.6** 0.5
[0.09] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.1] [0.3] [0.3]
* affiliate-country legal rights -0.03*** -0.009 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.06 -0.04
[0.01] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.04]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -673.4 -641.8 -685.1 -647.0 -676.7
R2 0.25 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.3*** 0.2 -0.006 0.1 0.05 0.6 0.3
[0.1] [0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.1] [0.4] [0.4]
* affiliate-country legal rights -0.04** -0.01 -0.006 -0.009 0.01 -0.06 -0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.07] [0.07]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -673.9 -641.8 -684.2 -645.5 -678.5
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs.
Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 10: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (affiliate-parent-country fixed effects)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.08*** 0.06** -0.04*** 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.1
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17
Log − likelihood -1394.0 -1266.0 -1351.0 -1323.2 -1458.5
R2 0.23 0.23
Affiliate-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.09*** -0.04** 0.03 0.04 0.1 0.2*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17
Log − likelihood -1393.4 -1263.8 -1353.3 -1322.7 -1458.7
R2 0.23 0.23
Affiliate-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.05* 0.05* -0.01 0.03 0.08** 0.2 0.2
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.24
Log − likelihood -563.0 -556.7 -587.8 -529.2 -597.9
R2 0.28 0.28
Affiliate-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1** 0.10** -0.04 0.10** 0.07 0.3 0.2
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.24
Log − likelihood -560.4 -555.6 -586.7 -527.2 -600.2
R2 0.28 0.28
Affiliate-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies No No No No No No No
Affiliate-parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-parent-country and affiliate-industry dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively. Dummies take value
1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced
for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on
robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 11: Parental assistance and the extensive margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm
exports with thresholds
Panel A: 25% of production inputs accounted for by intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports share ≥ 25% (dummy) 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.02 0.05* 0.06** 0.2*** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.088 0.087 0.078 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1577.8 -1421.2 -1520.0 -1495.6 -1624.2
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: 75% of production inputs accounted for by intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports share ≥ 75% (dummy) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.06* 0.05 0.2** 0.2***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.088 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.075
Log − likelihood -1578.5 -1418.9 -1520.8 -1495.1 -1626.1
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: 25% of total exports accounted for by intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports share ≥ 25% (dummy) 0.06* 0.05 -0.03 0.07* 0.09** 0.2 0.1
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -680.3 -643.5 -684.0 -646.0 -678.5
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: 75% of total exports accounted for by intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports share 75% (dummy) 0.1*** 0.09** -0.04 0.07 0.06 0.2 0.1
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.7 -642.3 -684.1 -646.6 -680.3
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively. Dummies take value
1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the
highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard
errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 12: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (main source of competition)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.09*** 0.07*** -0.02* 0.03 0.06*** 0.2** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
local competition (domestic firms) -0.07*** -0.01 0.006 -0.03 -0.04* -0.1* -0.1
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
local competition (foreign firms) -0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 1007 1008 1010 1010 1005 1011 1011
Pseudo−R2 0.100 0.088 0.083 0.063 0.077
Log − likelihood -1482.3 -1346.8 -1434.6 -1422.0 -1551.0
R2 0.13 0.14
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.01 0.05 0.08*** 0.3*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
local competition (domestic firms) -0.07*** -0.01 0.007 -0.03 -0.04* -0.1* -0.1
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
local competition (foreign firms) -0.0005 -0.005 0.005 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 1007 1008 1010 1010 1005 1011 1011
Pseudo−R2 0.100 0.090 0.082 0.063 0.077
Log − likelihood -1482.3 -1344.0 -1435.8 -1421.1 -1550.5
R2 0.14 0.14
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.06** 0.06** 0.01 0.03 0.10*** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.1] [0.1]
local competition (domestic firms) -0.05* 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
local competition (foreign firms) 0.003 -0.004 0.04** 0.04 0.08** 0.2 0.2
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 441 441 441 441 441 441 441
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.16
Log − likelihood -555.0 -539.5 -574.6 -558.8 -587.0
R2 0.27 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.10** 0.1** 0.005 0.1* 0.2*** 0.4** 0.4**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.2] [0.2]
local competition (domestic firms) -0.05* 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
local competition (foreign firms) 0.007 -0.0008 0.05** 0.04 0.09** 0.2 0.2
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 441 441 441 441 441 441 441
Pseudo−R2 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.16
Log − likelihood -555.6 -539.2 -574.8 -557.5 -587.8
R2 0.27 0.27
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based
on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
35
Table 13: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (acquisition mode of capital goods)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.06** 0.04 -0.03* 0.05* 0.04* 0.09 0.1
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
source of capital goods (imports) 0.01 0.03 -0.00006 -0.02 -0.1 -0.2 0.06
[0.08] [0.10] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09] [0.4] [0.4]
source of capital goods (local) -0.01 0.02 0.003 -0.06 -0.1 -0.3 -0.02
[0.08] [0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.09] [0.4] [0.4]
source of capital goods (parent) 0.1* 0.1 0.04 0.03 -0.1 0.01 0.3
[0.08] [0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.09] [0.4] [0.4]
Obs 836 838 839 839 839 840 840
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.11 0.086 0.082 0.10
Log − likelihood -1197.3 -1089.6 -1191.8 -1154.3 -1249.2
R2 0.17 0.17
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.09*** 0.07* -0.03 0.09** 0.07* 0.2 0.2*
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
source of capital goods (imports) 0.02 0.03 -0.0008 -0.01 -0.1 -0.2 0.06
[0.08] [0.09] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09] [0.4] [0.4]
source of capital goods (local) -0.004 0.02 0.0006 -0.05 -0.1 -0.3 -0.01
[0.08] [0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.09] [0.4] [0.4]
source of capital goods (parent) 0.1* 0.1 0.03 0.02 -0.1 -0.01 0.3
[0.08] [0.10] [0.06] [0.1] [0.09] [0.4] [0.4]
Obs 836 838 839 839 839 840 840
Pseudo−R2 0.12 0.11 0.085 0.083 0.10
Log − likelihood -1196.8 -1088.7 -1192.9 -1152.6 -1248.7
R2 0.17 0.17
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.04 0.05 -0.007 0.03 0.1*** 0.2* 0.2
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.1]
source of capital goods (imports) -0.10* -0.1 -0.06 -0.09 -0.1 -0.5** -0.2
[0.06] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.09] [0.3] [0.3]
source of capital goods (local) -0.2*** -0.1 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.6* -0.2
[0.07] [0.1] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1] [0.3] [0.4]
source of capital goods (parent) 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.2 -0.4 -0.004
[0.07] [0.10] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1] [0.3] [0.4]
Obs 499 499 499 499 499 500 500
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -661.1 -631.2 -676.3 -639.4 -666.8
R2 0.25 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.08* 0.07 -0.04 0.1** 0.1** 0.2* 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.1] [0.2]
source of capital goods (imports) -0.09* -0.1 -0.06 -0.09 -0.1 -0.5** -0.2
[0.05] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.09] [0.2] [0.3]
source of capital goods (local) -0.2*** -0.1 -0.07 -0.09 -0.1 -0.6** -0.3
[0.06] [0.1] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1] [0.3] [0.4]
source of capital goods (parent) 0.006 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.2 -0.4 0.006
[0.06] [0.10] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1] [0.3] [0.4]
Obs 499 499 499 499 499 500 500
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.14
Log − likelihood -660.4 -631.3 -675.3 -637.8 -668.6
R2 0.25 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects
produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table 14: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (sample of firms in goods-producing industries)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.10*** 0.08*** -0.03 0.05** 0.04* 0.2* 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 831 832 834 833 833 835 835
Pseudo−R2 0.11 0.10 0.085 0.078 0.096
Log − likelihood -1203.6 -1090.0 -1188.9 -1150.6 -1250.9
R2 0.15 0.15
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.10** 0.06* 0.3*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 831 832 834 833 833 835 835
Pseudo−R2 0.11 0.10 0.084 0.079 0.097
Log − likelihood -1202.2 -1087.2 -1189.8 -1148.5 -1250.3
R2 0.15 0.16
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.07*** 0.07** -0.006 0.04 0.1*** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
Obs 497 497 497 497 497 498 498
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -669.3 -635.2 -678.8 -637.5 -667.4
R2 0.25 0.25
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.1** -0.04 0.1** 0.1** 0.3** 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.1] [0.2]
Obs 497 497 497 497 497 498 498
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -667.3 -635.3 -677.8 -636.1 -669.3
R2 0.25 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Sample restricted to foreign affiliates in goods-producing industries. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy
explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed
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Figure A1: Overall measure of parental assistance to importing foreign affiliates (kernel den-
sity)
Figure A2: Overall measure of parental assistance to importing foreign affiliates (percentile
distribution)
47
Figure A3: Overall measure of parental assistance to exporting foreign affiliates (kernel den-
sity)
Figure A4: Overall measure of parental assistance to exporting foreign affiliates (percentile
distribution)
48
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for additional firm- and country-level dummy variables (ro-
bustness checks)
Panel A: Firm-level
Dummy variable No Yes Total
# % # % # %
intra-firm imports share ≥ 25% 1134 77.4 332 22.6 1466 100
intra-firm imports share ≥ 75% 1260 85.9 206 14.1 1466 100
intra-firm exports share ≥ 25% 1331 90.8 135 9.2 1466 100
intra-firm exports share ≥ 75% 1389 94.7 77 5.3 1466 100
patents, trademarks, brand names = 0 1263 89 156 11 1419 100
patents, trademarks, brand names = 1 1303 91.8 116 8.2 1419 100
patents, trademarks, brand names = 2 1330 93.7 89 6.3 1419 100
patents, trademarks, brand names = 3 1107 78 312 22 1419 100
patents, trademarks, brand names = 4 993 70 426 30 1419 100
patents, trademarks, brand names = 5 1099 77.4 320 22.6 1419 100
technology and know-how = 0 1341 94.4 80 5.6 1421 100
technology and know-how = 1 1363 95.9 58 4.1 1421 100
technology and know-how = 2 1347 94.8 74 5.2 1421 100
technology and know-how = 3 1034 72.8 387 27.2 1421 100
technology and know-how = 4 911 64.1 510 35.9 1421 100
technology and know-how = 5 1109 78 312 22 1421 100
staff quality upgrading = 0 1346 94.7 75 5.3 1421 100
staff quality upgrading = 1 1323 93.1 98 6.9 1421 100
staff quality upgrading = 2 1257 88.5 164 11.5 1421 100
staff quality upgrading = 3 961 67.6 460 32.4 1421 100
staff quality upgrading = 4 966 68 455 32 1421 100
staff quality upgrading = 5 1252 88.1 169 11.9 1421 100
foreign supplier network access = 0 1357 95.4 65 4.6 1422 100
foreign supplier network access = 1 1361 95.7 61 4.3 1422 100
foreign supplier network access = 2 1323 93 99 7 1422 100
foreign supplier network access = 3 1073 75.5 349 24.5 1422 100
foreign supplier network access = 4 911 64.1 511 35.9 1422 100
foreign supplier network access = 5 1085 76.3 337 23.7 1422 100
global markets access = 0 1266 89.5 149 10.5 1415 100
global markets access = 1 1328 93.9 87 6.1 1415 100
global markets access = 2 1299 91.8 116 8.2 1415 100
global markets access = 3 1116 78.9 299 21.1 1415 100
global markets access = 4 1008 71.2 407 28.8 1415 100
global markets access = 5 1058 74.8 357 25.2 1415 100
firm age = {1, 5} 1255 86.1 203 13.9 1458 100
firm age = {6, 10} 1154 79.1 304 20.9 1458 100
firm age = {11, 20} 943 64.7 515 35.3 1458 100
firm age > 20 1022 70.1 436 29.9 1458 100
import competition 969 71.3 390 28.7 1359 100
local competition (domestic firms) 862 63.4 497 36.6 1359 100
local competition (foreign firms) 887 65.3 472 34.7 1359 100
source of capital goods (imports) 306 26.8 837 73.2 1143 100
source of capital goods (local) 1013 88.6 130 11.4 1143 100
source of capital goods (parent) 988 86.4 155 13.6 1143 100
source of capital goods (other) 1122 98.2 21 1.8 1143 100
Panel B: Country-level
Dummy variable No Yes Total
# % # % # %
common language 200 56.8 152 43.2 352 100
past colonial ties 333 94.6 19 5.4 352 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Each dummy is equal to 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0
otherwise. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics for additional firm- and country-level non-dummy variables
(robustness checks)
Panel A: Firm-level
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max
sales (million USD) 1434 2 25 0 552
average wage (thousand USD) 1386 5 152 0 5569
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 1275 2.71 3.67 0 67
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) 1274 3.97 4.24 0 69
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) 1315 2.07 2.08 0 23
tax to assets 1169 24.47 317.72 0 8920
Panel B: Country-level
Variable Obs Mean Sd Min Max
affiliate-country legal rights strength 19 5.2 2.6 2 10
affiliate-country rule of law 19 58.3 13.6 29 87
geographic distance (in km) 352 5857 3446 24 16384
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The data on legal rights strength in affiliate countries correspond to the year 2009. For the
description of the variables, see Table A1.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table A4: Unreceived parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm
imports and intra-firm exports
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unreceived parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.01** -0.01 -0.03**
[0.01] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.01]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.4 -1421.6 -1519.1 -1496.0 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unreceived parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) -0.08*** -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02** -0.04**
[0.02] [0.01] [0.009] [0.009] [0.02]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.1 -1419.1 -1520.2 -1494.8 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unreceived parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) -0.04*** -0.02** 0.004 -0.01 -0.04***
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.01]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.0 -642.2 -685.3 -647.1 -676.7
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unreceived parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) -0.08*** -0.04** 0.02 -0.03* -0.04**
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.5 -642.1 -684.3 -645.6 -678.6
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns of all
panels. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables,
only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the lowest outcome of the dependent variable (= 0)
are displayed in all columns of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard
errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A5: Unimportant parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-
firm imports and intra-firm exports
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unimportant parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) -0.03*** -0.01*** 0.01** -0.008 -0.01**
[0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.4 -1421.6 -1519.1 -1496.0 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unimportant parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.01 -0.01** -0.02**
[0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.1 -1419.1 -1520.2 -1494.8 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unimportant parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) -0.02*** -0.01** 0.003 -0.008 -0.02**
[0.009] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.009]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.0 -642.2 -685.3 -647.1 -676.7
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable unimportant parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) -0.04*** -0.02** 0.02 -0.02* -0.03**
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.5 -642.1 -684.3 -645.6 -678.6
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns of all
panels. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables,
only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the fifth highest outcome of the dependent variable
(= 1) are displayed in all columns of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust
standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A6: Slightly important parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of
intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable slightly important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02** -0.01* -0.01**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.4 -1421.6 -1519.1 -1496.0 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable slightly important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02 -0.02** -0.02**
[0.005] [0.007] [0.01] [0.010] [0.008]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.1 -1419.1 -1520.2 -1494.8 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable slightly important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) -0.01** -0.01** 0.004 -0.008 -0.02***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.01] [0.007] [0.008]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.0 -642.2 -685.3 -647.1 -676.7
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable slightly important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) -0.02*** -0.02** 0.03 -0.02* -0.02**
[0.009] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.5 -642.1 -684.3 -645.6 -678.6
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns of all
panels. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables,
only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the fourth highest outcome of the dependent variable
(= 2) are displayed in all columns of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust
standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A7: Important parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm
imports and intra-firm exports
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.01** -0.02 -0.01**
[0.007] [0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.005]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.4 -1421.6 -1519.1 -1496.0 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) -0.04*** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.03** -0.02**
[0.009] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.007]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.1 -1419.1 -1520.2 -1494.8 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) -0.02*** -0.03** 0.003 -0.02 -0.03***
[0.009] [0.02] [0.008] [0.02] [0.01]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.0 -642.2 -685.3 -647.1 -676.7
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) -0.04*** -0.05** 0.02 -0.05** -0.04**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.5 -642.1 -684.3 -645.6 -678.6
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns of all
panels. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables,
only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the third highest outcome of the dependent variable
(= 3) are displayed in all columns of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust
standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A8: Very important parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of
intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable very important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.03** 0.01* 0.02**
[0.008] [0.007] [0.01] [0.007] [0.007]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.087 0.079 0.059 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.4 -1421.6 -1519.1 -1496.0 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable very important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.03 0.02** 0.02**
[0.01] [0.010] [0.02] [0.009] [0.010]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1575.1 -1419.1 -1520.2 -1494.8 -1624.4
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable very important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.03*** 0.02** -0.008 0.010 0.01**
[0.01] [0.009] [0.02] [0.008] [0.006]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.0 -642.2 -685.3 -647.1 -676.7
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable very important parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) 0.05*** 0.03** -0.05 0.03* 0.01*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.01] [0.009]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.5 -642.1 -684.3 -645.6 -678.6
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns of all
panels. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables,
only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the second highest outcome of the dependent variable
(= 4) are displayed in all columns of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust
standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A9: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (the role of rule of law in affiliate countries)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.3*** 0.3*** -0.09 0.2** 0.05 0.5* 0.7**
[0.1] [0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.1] [0.3] [0.3]
* affiliate-country rule of law -0.003* -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.00004 -0.006 -0.008
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.091 0.088 0.079 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1573.6 -1419.8 -1518.6 -1494.4 -1624.4
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.2* 0.3** -0.04 0.3** 0.04 0.6 0.7*
[0.1] [0.1] [0.08] [0.1] [0.1] [0.4] [0.4]
* affiliate-country rule of law -0.003 -0.004* 0.0003 -0.006* 0.0008 -0.007 -0.01
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.089 0.078 0.061 0.076
Log − likelihood -1574.6 -1417.8 -1520.2 -1492.7 -1624.3
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.2 0.2 0.002 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4
[0.1] [0.1] [0.09] [0.1] [0.2] [0.5] [0.5]
* affiliate-country rule of law -0.002 -0.002 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.0001 -0.006 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -677.4 -641.8 -685.3 -646.8 -676.7
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.3* 0.2 -0.02 0.2 -0.006 0.6 0.2
[0.2] [0.1] [0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.5] [0.6]
* affiliate-country rule of law -0.004 -0.003 -0.0005 -0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.0004
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.01] [0.01]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -675.6 -641.7 -684.3 -645.2 -678.4
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs.
Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A10: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (affiliate-parent-country variables)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.09*** 0.07*** -0.03* 0.04 0.05** 0.2** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
geographic distance -0.1*** -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.2* -0.2*
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.1] [0.1]
common language 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03
[0.06] [0.06] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05] [0.2] [0.2]
past colonial ties 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.2 0.2
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
Obs 1054 1055 1057 1057 1053 1059 1059
Pseudo−R2 0.094 0.087 0.080 0.060 0.076
Log − likelihood -1566.1 -1418.5 -1515.9 -1492.5 -1621.6
R2 0.13 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.07** 0.07** 0.2*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
geographic distance -0.1*** -0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.2* -0.2*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.1] [0.1]
common language 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03
[0.06] [0.06] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05] [0.2] [0.2]
past colonial ties 0.005 0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.03 0.2 0.2
[0.07] [0.08] [0.04] [0.08] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
Obs 1054 1055 1057 1057 1053 1059 1059
Pseudo−R2 0.094 0.089 0.079 0.061 0.076
Log − likelihood -1565.7 -1416.2 -1516.9 -1491.3 -1621.6
R2 0.13 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.07** 0.06** -0.004 0.03 0.10*** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
geographic distance -0.2*** -0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.1* -0.2 -0.2
[0.05] [0.06] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
common language -0.1* -0.2*** -0.04 -0.1 -0.2* -0.6** -0.6**
[0.07] [0.08] [0.04] [0.09] [0.1] [0.3] [0.3]
past colonial ties -0.2* 0.005 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.07 0.07
[0.1] [0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.1] [0.4] [0.4]
Obs 503 503 503 503 503 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.15
Log − likelihood -662.3 -635.3 -683.7 -644.0 -671.7
R2 0.26 0.26
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.1** -0.03 0.10** 0.1** 0.3** 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.1] [0.2]
geographic distance -0.2*** -0.07 0.02 -0.07 -0.1* -0.2 -0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
common language -0.1* -0.2*** -0.04 -0.1 -0.2* -0.6** -0.6**
[0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.09] [0.1] [0.3] [0.3]
past colonial ties -0.2* -0.006 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.04
[0.1] [0.1] [0.07] [0.1] [0.1] [0.4] [0.4]
Obs 503 503 503 503 503 504 504
Pseudo−R2 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.14
Log − likelihood -660.1 -634.9 -682.8 -642.5 -673.6
R2 0.26 0.25
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment, productivity and geographic
distance are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A11: Dummies for each rank of parental assistance by area names and the extensive
and intensive margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports
Panel A: Use of patents, trademarks and brand names
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
patents, trademarks, brand names = 0 -0.3*** -0.2*** -0.3*** -0.2***
[0.06] [0.04] [0.09] [0.07]
patents, trademarks, brand names = 1 -0.07 -0.06 -0.2* -0.1
[0.06] [0.06] [0.09] [0.08]
patents, trademarks, brand names = 2 -0.1* -0.1*** -0.1 -0.05
[0.07] [0.05] [0.10] [0.08]
patents, trademarks, brand names = 3 -0.1** -0.09** -0.05 -0.09*
[0.04] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05]
patents, trademarks, brand names = 4 -0.07** -0.07** -0.05 -0.08*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05]
Obs 980 1056 434 504
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.23
Log − likelihood -483.6 -217.2
R2 0.11 0.22
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Technology and know-how
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
technology and know-how = 0 -0.2*** -0.2*** -0.3*** -0.1**
[0.07] [0.05] [0.1] [0.07]
technology and know-how = 1 -0.08 -0.09 -0.1 -0.10
[0.08] [0.07] [0.1] [0.10]
technology and know-how = 2 -0.1* -0.1** -0.1 -0.07
[0.07] [0.05] [0.1] [0.08]
technology and know-how = 3 -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.04 -0.05
[0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05]
technology and know-how = 4 -0.08** -0.09*** -0.03 -0.03
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04]
Obs 981 1057 434 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.22
Log − likelihood -490.4 -218.8
R2 0.11 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Quality upgrading of staff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
staff quality upgrading = 0 0.1 0.06 -0.06 0.05
[0.07] [0.06] [0.1] [0.1]
staff quality upgrading = 1 0.10 0.06 -0.005 0.03
[0.06] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
staff quality upgrading = 2 0.06 0.0008 0.09 0.1
[0.06] [0.05] [0.08] [0.07]
staff quality upgrading = 3 0.01 -0.004 -0.09 0.01
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
staff quality upgrading = 4 -0.007 -0.02 -0.09 0.01
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06]
Obs 983 1059 434 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.22
Log − likelihood -495.9 -218.9
R2 0.096 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Dummies for each rank of parental assistance by area names and the extensive and intensive
margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm exports (continued)
Panel D: Access to foreign supplier network
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
foreign supplier network access = 0 -0.08 -0.1* -0.1 -0.10
[0.07] [0.06] [0.1] [0.07]
foreign supplier network access = 1 -0.06 0.007 -0.08 -0.06
[0.08] [0.07] [0.1] [0.10]
foreign supplier network access = 2 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08
[0.05] [0.05] [0.1] [0.06]
foreign supplier network access = 3 -0.1*** -0.1*** -0.08 -0.09*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05]
foreign supplier network access = 4 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.1* -0.08*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04]
Obs 983 1059 434 504
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.21
Log − likelihood -489.9 -221.2
R2 0.11 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel E: Access to global markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm intra-firm
imports imports exports exports
(dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
global markets access = 0 -0.1** -0.08* -0.2** -0.1**
[0.05] [0.04] [0.10] [0.06]
global markets access = 1 -0.06 -0.02 -0.2** -0.03
[0.06] [0.06] [0.1] [0.08]
global markets access = 2 -0.1** -0.1*** -0.04 -0.07
[0.06] [0.04] [0.10] [0.05]
global markets access = 3 -0.03 -0.04 -0.1** -0.09**
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04]
global markets access = 4 -0.07* -0.05 -0.2*** -0.08*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04]
Obs 979 1055 434 504
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.23
Log − likelihood -491.1 -216.5
R2 0.11 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in
columns 1 and 3 and columns 2 and 4 of all panels, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding
statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and produc-
tivity are in logs. Marginal effects are displayed in columns 1 and 3 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see
Table A1.
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Table A12: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (total sales in lieu of total employment)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.03** 0.04* 0.05** 0.2** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
sales 0.01** 0.01* -0.002 0.01** 0.006 0.02 0.03
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.089 0.086 0.078 0.059 0.075
Log − likelihood -1576.1 -1421.7 -1520.0 -1496.0 -1626.5
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.03 0.07** 0.07** 0.2*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
sales 0.01** 0.010* -0.003 0.01** 0.006 0.02 0.03
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 1056 1057 1059 1059 1055 1061 1061
Pseudo−R2 0.089 0.088 0.078 0.060 0.075
Log − likelihood -1575.8 -1419.2 -1521.2 -1494.8 -1626.6
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.08*** 0.06** -0.006 0.04 0.10*** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
sales -0.005 0.01 -0.0003 0.01* 0.006 0.003 0.008
[0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.3 -642.3 -685.4 -647.1 -676.7
R2 0.25 0.25
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.1** -0.03 0.10** 0.1** 0.3** 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.1] [0.2]
sales -0.004 0.01 0.00010 0.01* 0.008 0.008 0.01
[0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 504 504 504 504 504 505 505
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -676.8 -642.2 -684.4 -645.6 -678.6
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only total sales are in logs. Labour productivity
is dropped from regressions for the avoidance of multi-collinearity. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in
columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see
Table A1.
60
Table A13: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (average wage in lieu of skill intensity)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.10*** 0.08*** -0.03* 0.04 0.04** 0.2** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
average wage 0.002 -0.008 -0.010 0.009 0.01 0.003 0.003
[0.009] [0.010] [0.006] [0.01] [0.010] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 1031 1032 1034 1034 1030 1036 1036
Pseudo−R2 0.089 0.089 0.081 0.060 0.078
Log − likelihood -1540.9 -1382.3 -1484.2 -1453.1 -1578.2
R2 0.12 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.07** 0.06** 0.2*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
average wage 0.001 -0.008 -0.010 0.009 0.01 0.001 0.002
[0.009] [0.010] [0.006] [0.01] [0.010] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 1031 1032 1034 1034 1030 1036 1036
Pseudo−R2 0.089 0.090 0.080 0.061 0.078
Log − likelihood -1540.5 -1380.1 -1485.3 -1451.8 -1577.7
R2 0.13 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.07** 0.05* -0.007 0.04 0.09** 0.2** 0.2*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
average wage -0.007 0.002 -0.005 0.008 0.02 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.04]
Obs 496 496 496 496 496 497 497
Pseudo−R2 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -678.7 -636.3 -678.2 -637.2 -665.5
R2 0.22 0.22
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1** 0.08* -0.04 0.09* 0.1* 0.3* 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.1] [0.2]
average wage -0.004 0.005 -0.006 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.04]
Obs 496 496 496 496 496 497 497
Pseudo−R2 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -677.9 -636.3 -677.0 -636.2 -666.9
R2 0.21 0.21
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment, productivity and the average
wage are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A14: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (relative monthly wage for production, non-production and managerial
workers in lieu of skill intensity)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.03** 0.05** 0.05** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 0.004* -0.0003 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008]
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) -0.006** 0.0004 -0.002 -0.008** -0.004 -0.01 -0.01
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.01] [0.01]
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) 0.01** 0.007 0.005 0.02** 0.005 0.03 0.02
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 939 939 941 941 940 943 943
Pseudo−R2 0.096 0.094 0.077 0.071 0.085
Log − likelihood -1387.7 -1253.1 -1347.6 -1310.8 -1430.2
R2 0.13 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.09*** 0.07** 0.3*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.10] [0.10]
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 0.004 -0.0003 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008]
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) -0.006** 0.0005 -0.002 -0.008** -0.004 -0.01 -0.010
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.01] [0.01]
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) 0.01** 0.007 0.005 0.02** 0.004 0.03 0.02
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008] [0.03] [0.03]
Obs 939 939 941 941 940 943 943
Pseudo−R2 0.096 0.096 0.076 0.073 0.085
Log − likelihood -1387.5 -1251.1 -1349.0 -1308.7 -1430.3
R2 0.13 0.14
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.06** 0.06* -0.008 0.04 0.1*** 0.2** 0.2*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 0.005* 0.0006 0.0008 0.003 0.008** 0.02 0.01
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.009]
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) -0.007* -0.004 -0.004 -0.01** -0.01** -0.03** -0.03**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.01] [0.01]
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.005 0.05* 0.05*
[0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.01] [0.009] [0.02] [0.02]
Obs 479 479 479 479 479 480 480
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.15
Log − likelihood -646.4 -600.4 -644.0 -601.1 -629.7
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.08* -0.04 0.1** 0.1** 0.3* 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
monthly wage (non-production to production workers) 0.005* 0.0005 0.0008 0.003 0.007** 0.01 0.01
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.010]
monthly wage (managerial to production workers) -0.007* -0.004 -0.003 -0.01** -0.01** -0.03** -0.03**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.01] [0.01]
monthly wage (managerial to non-production workers) 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.006 0.05* 0.05*
[0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.01] [0.009] [0.03] [0.02]
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.15
Log − likelihood -644.4 -600.7 -642.9 -599.7 -632.4
R2 0.24 0.24
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively. Dummies take value 1 if the
corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the
dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables,
see Table A1.
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Table A15: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (dummies for firm age ranges)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.03** 0.04 0.05** 0.2** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
firm age = {1, 5} 0.07* 0.07* 0.01 0.07* 0.06* 0.2 0.2*
[0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
firm age = {6, 10} 0.0005 0.02 -0.01 -0.007 -0.009 -0.03 -0.05
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
firm age = {11, 20} 0.0005 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.009
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 1066 1067 1069 1069 1065 1071 1071
Pseudo−R2 0.089 0.087 0.080 0.060 0.077
Log − likelihood -1592.4 -1433.6 -1533.2 -1510.4 -1637.1
R2 0.13 0.13
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.03 0.06* 0.07** 0.2*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
firm age = {1, 5} 0.06* 0.06* 0.01 0.07* 0.06 0.2 0.2
[0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
firm age = {6, 10} -0.003 0.02 -0.01 -0.008 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
firm age = {11, 20} -0.0002 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.010
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08]
Obs 1066 1067 1069 1069 1065 1071 1071
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.088 0.079 0.060 0.077
Log − likelihood -1591.1 -1431.3 -1534.6 -1509.4 -1636.8
R2 0.13 0.14
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.07*** 0.06** -0.002 0.04 0.1*** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
firm age = {1, 5} 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.1 -0.10
[0.05] [0.06] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
firm age = {6, 10} 0.005 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.007 -0.008 -0.04
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1]
firm age = {11, 20} -0.03 -0.03 -0.04* -0.03 -0.05 -0.2** -0.2*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 511 511 511 511 511 512 512
Pseudo−R2 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -699.7 -659.4 -697.7 -662.6 -689.9
R2 0.23 0.23
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.10** -0.03 0.09* 0.1** 0.3** 0.2
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.1] [0.2]
firm age = {1, 5} 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.1 -0.10
[0.05] [0.06] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.2] [0.2]
firm age = {6, 10} -0.0005 0.02 -0.009 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.1] [0.1]
firm age = {11, 20} -0.04 -0.04 -0.04* -0.04 -0.05 -0.2** -0.2*
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.1] [0.1]
Obs 511 511 511 511 511 512 512
Pseudo−R2 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
Log − likelihood -698.7 -659.5 -697.1 -661.3 -691.9
R2 0.23 0.22
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively.
Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs.
Marginal effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A16: Parental assistance and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports
and intra-firm exports (tax to assets ratio in lieu of tax to sales ratio)
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.1*** 0.09*** -0.02 0.03 0.04* 0.2*** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.07] [0.07]
tax to assets 0.0000004 0.00000004 0.000002 0.000002 -0.00001 -0.000008 -0.00001
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00004] [0.00003]
Obs 976 978 979 980 976 981 981
Pseudo−R2 0.091 0.096 0.080 0.060 0.075
Log − likelihood -1448.4 -1295.9 -1387.8 -1374.6 -1505.5
R2 0.11 0.12
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm imports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.003 0.04 0.05* 0.3*** 0.3***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
tax to assets 0.000007 0.000005 0.000001 0.000004 -0.000009 0.000002 -0.0000010
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00004] [0.00004]
Obs 976 978 979 980 976 981 981
Pseudo−R2 0.090 0.098 0.080 0.060 0.075
Log − likelihood -1449.3 -1293.1 -1388.4 -1374.3 -1505.5
R2 0.11 0.12
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.06** 0.07** 0.006 0.03 0.09*** 0.2** 0.2**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.10] [0.10]
tax to assets -0.000002 0.0000002 -0.0000004 0.000005 -0.00003* -0.00003 -0.00003
[0.000010] [0.00001] [0.000008] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00005] [0.00005]
Obs 467 467 467 467 467 468 468
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.14
Log − likelihood -616.9 -587.5 -616.3 -595.3 -630.4
R2 0.23 0.23
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global overall overall
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets measure measure
brand names know-how of staff network access access (mean) (weighted average)
intra-firm exports (share) 0.1*** 0.1*** -0.005 0.1** 0.1** 0.4*** 0.3*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.06] [0.1] [0.2]
tax to assets -0.000003 -0.0000004 0.00000004 0.000003 -0.00003* -0.00003 -0.00003
[0.000009] [0.00001] [0.000008] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00005] [0.00005]
Obs 467 467 467 467 467 468 468
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14
Log − likelihood -613.9 -586.1 -616.3 -593.5 -631.4
R2 0.24 0.23
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit and OLS estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in columns 1–5 and 6–7 of all panels, respectively. Dummies
take value 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal
effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in columns 1–5 of all panels. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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Table A17: Assistance to individual foreign investor from other associate companies in the
business group and the extensive and intensive margins of intra-firm imports and intra-firm
exports
Panel A: Extensive margin of intra-firm imports
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (dummy) 0.02 0.004 0.02 0.02 0.003
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Obs 519 519 518 521 516
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.12
Log − likelihood -699.2 -711.3 -728.0 -751.4 -768.0
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Intensive margin of intra-firm imports
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm imports (share) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04]
Obs 519 519 518 521 516
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.12
Log − likelihood -699.4 -711.3 -728.3 -751.7 -767.9
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Extensive margin of intra-firm exports
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (dummy) 0.04* 0.04* 0.01 0.03** 0.1***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04]
Obs 205 205 204 205 204
Pseudo−R2 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.29
Log − likelihood -221.5 -233.4 -240.4 -240.8 -243.1
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Intensive margin of intra-firm exports
Dependent variable: crucial parental assistance in
patents, technology quality foreign global
trademarks, and upgrading supplier markets
brand names know-how of staff network access access
intra-firm exports (share) 0.09** 0.07* -0.004 0.02 0.1*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06]
Obs 205 205 204 205 204
Pseudo−R2 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.28
Log − likelihood -220.4 -233.7 -240.7 -242.3 -248.0
Affiliate-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliate-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Ordered probit estimations with affiliate-country, affiliate-industry, and parent-country dummies in all columns. Sample
restricted to foreign affiliates owned by an individual foreign investor. Dummies take value 1 if the corresponding statement
is valid, and 0 otherwise. Among non-dummy explanatory variables, only employment and productivity are in logs. Marginal
effects produced for the highest outcome of the dependent variable (= 5) are displayed in all columns. *** significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, based on robust standard errors. For the description of the variables, see Table A1.
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